The acquisition of an American multinational’s packaging business by a large German group destroyed value by replacing an entrepreneurial culture with centralised decision-making. Former managers then founded a new company in Luxembourg, which quickly became ‘best in class’ and now is the largest plant of its kind in Europe. Interview with Marc Jacobs, ILA Startup & Scaleup Committee Member.
Culture is notoriously hard to define — let alone govern. What concrete signals did the acquiring board miss in due diligence that, in hindsight, predicted the cultural collapse?
The big miss was understanding the impact of the huge difference in decision making processes between themselves and the acquired company. The acquired company was organised in regional business units with substantial decision authority. This attracts and rewards ‘entrepreneurial’ managers. The negative impact of centralisation on the motivation of the local teams was dramatic, and many left the company.
An organisation’s culture is often rooted in the national culture of its origins.
The board could have looked at the key differences in national culture between the US and Germany and used that to anticipate these challenges. More specifically, the difference in uncertainty avoidance (USA = 46 vs Germany = 65) is a strong indication that the American company will probably be goal-focused and take decisions fast whereas the German company is likely to be more process-focused and take time to make decisions very carefully.
I want to stress that neither approach is right or wrong. The key challenge was that the differences were very substantial and were not consciously engaged with.
You describe the transition from entrepreneurial to centralised culture as immediate and damaging. Was there a point where the board could have intervened and reversed course, or was the cultural outcome locked in by the deal structure itself?
That is a very good question. I think that the key issue was that the board felt that their approach e.g. their ‘culture’, was the ‘right’ one. The acquired company (although similar in size & very successful) was expected to adapt.
I am not sure that reversing course would have worked as such because they had a similar business themselves that was built on a very different mindset but was also successful. The key question was how to make them successful together.
Generally, speaking, in the case of an M&A transaction, best practice is to measure the organisational culture of both the acquiring & the acquired company in a quantitative way. This provides granular, structured data similar to a financial balance sheet and enables the parties to identify similarities & gaps. Then, conscious choices can be made as to what the optimal culture of the combined company should look like. The similarities can then be used as foundations to ensure that the culture supports the execution of the strategy. In the end, one of the ‘keys to success’ is conscious engagement with the topic of culture.
LuxPET’s success was built on the same values the acquirer destroyed. How did the founding team deliberately encode that culture into their governance model from the start?
Having gone through a ‘how-not-to-do-it’ example, the founding team designed decision-making processes, metrics and bonus systems that ultimately encouraged and empowered each and every team member to make decisions from a perspective of what is best for the customer as well as for the company. Decision-making was delegated as low down in the organization as possible. Not making a decision was judged as worse than making a sub-optimal decision. As an example, regardless of cost or other implications, a line operator did not need approval from anyone to shut down an entire production line if there was a quality issue.
Where does board responsibility for culture end and management responsibility begin? How do you draw that line in practice without boards overstepping into operational territory?
Fundamentally, from a board perspective, this is a question of risk management.
The board’s responsibility is to ensure that processes are in place to:
- Make there that optimal culture (e.g. the one that will best support the execution of the strategy) is defined by the management team & validated by the board.
- measure the actual culture against the optimal culture on a sufficiently granular level (similar to financial management)
- take actions to close the gap between actual and optimal culture
- perform regular reviews & risk assessments
The execution of the above is the responsibility of the management team.
As LuxPET scaled into becoming Europe’s largest plant of its kind, how did the board protect the founding culture while still professionalising the organisation?
As organisations grow and mature, it is likely that the definition of what constitutes the ‘optimal culture’ needs to change. In the very early stages, the optimal culture probably looks something like :
- minimal systems and processes and a very high goal orientation.
- very high degree of flexibility and high customer orientation.
As an organisation matures, it may need to shift towards more process orientation and less flexibility.
In order to protect the culture, during the scale-up phase, the board guided the choice of an ERP system for one that enabled increased control whilst maintaining lots of flexibility. After the sale to an American company, again, the board helped convince the parent company that a ‘highly tailored’ implementation of SAP rather than a company-standard, ‘cookie-cutter’ approach was needed to ensure maximum flexibility and continued support for high customer orientation.
Editor’s note: As part of the collaboration between Silicon Luxembourg and ILA, members of the ILA Startup and Scaleup Committee are sharing their stories on governance. These reflect their personal views only and do not necessarily represent the official position of ILA.